Higher education is the education level under the most pressure to be internationally liberalized. Currently, the main global instrument to achieve this liberalization goal is the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In this article, the process of trade liberalization of higher education in the GATS framework is examined. The analysis is divided in two main parts. First, the state of the current situation of higher education liberalization and that of other education sectors are reviewed and compared. Second, the factors that influence the undertaking of liberalization commitments on education, specifically higher education, are analyzed. To make these comparative analyses, EduGATS, a novel index to measure the degree of liberalization of educational services is introduced.
Introduction 1
Trade in Higher Education has increased its weight in world trade since the nineties. Higher education is the education level outstandingly more present in trade flows (Larsen and Vincent-Lancrin 2002) . In fact, higher education has become one of the main services exportation industries in countries such as Australia, New Zealand and the USA (Larsen, Martin et al. 2002) . Consequently, some governments and the higher education industry are increasingly interested in the elimination of barriers to education 1 trade. One of the main instruments to reach this objective is the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS) of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
At present, the 151 member countries of the WTO are negotiating the liberalization of Higher Education and other educational services in the Doha Round framework. Even so, the liberalization of educational services within the GATS took its first steps during the Uruguay Round of GATT (1986 GATT ( -1994 , when 28 countries established the first commitments on education liberalization in the framework of a trade agreement.
My research aims to compare higher education liberalization with that of other education sectors, as well as to analyse the causes of the liberalization of Higher Education, and education in its broadest sense, within the GATS. Specifically, the research focuses on the factors that influence the establishment of liberalization commitments. The suggested factors are the economic inequalities between member countries and specific characteristics of these countries' educational systems (level of privatization of educational spending, weight of the private sector, among others). The indicators for each variable are specified below.
The article is divided into four parts. In the first section, the GATS negotiation methodology, its architecture and its contents are briefly examined. Second, by taking into account the data previously presented, I construct the EduGATS index. EduGATS aims to measure the degree of commitment to educational liberalization undertaken by member countries of the WTO. After, the higher education liberalization commitments consolidated by member countries are reviewed and compared to the liberalization commitments undertaken in other education levels (primary, secondary, adults and other). Finally, the factors that influence the liberalization of educational services are 
Brief introduction to the GATS negotiation process
The GATS is one of the main agreements of the WTO. Its main aim is to expand the world trade in services by means of establishing a progressively liberalized multilateral framework of principles and rules for trade in services. The GATS promotes the liberalization of twelve service sectors, among which there are the educational services.
Services sectors are, in turn, composed by different sub sectors. Higher Education is one of them. Specifically, the educational sub sectors are: 1) primary education; 2) secondary education; 3) higher education; 4) adult education; and 5) other educational services.
The architecture of GATS is more complex than the architecture of trade agreements on goods, due to the technical difficulties associated with the commercialization of services. It has to be acknowledged that services are usually consumed where they are produced and are both produced and consumed simultaneously (Francois and Wooton 2000) . Given these difficulties, it has been established that there are four modes of trade in services. These are: 1) Cross-border supply: provision of a service at a distance. In the case of education, this mode is seen in e-learning or in other distance learning programmes; 2) Consumption abroad: the consumer -in our case the student -travels to another country to access the service; 3)
Commercial presence: the service company sets up a subsidiary abroad. For example, a university sets up a campus abroad; 4) Presence of natural persons: a professional (researcher or teacher) travels to a foreign country to provide a service. The liberalization of services is negotiated on the basis of these four modes, hence markets may be opened in one of the modes but not in the other three.
Additionally, it should be pointed out that the liberalization of services stipulated by GATS means the establishment of commitments on trade opening with reference to two clauses: National Treatment and Market Access. The acquisition of commitments on liberalization in terms of National Treatment means accepting that foreign providers benefit from treatment 'not less favorable' conditions than those given to domestic companies. This implies that foreign suppliers cannot be discriminated. Total number of service transactions or total sum of service production; d) Total number of natural persons who may be employed in a sector or by a specific supplier; e) Specific type of legal form or personality of suppliers; and f) Establishment of specific percentages of participation for foreign capital or the total value of foreign investments.
Additionally, there are a series of principles that are not subject to negotiation.
This would be the case with the general obligations and disciplines, such as the Most Favored Nation (article II) and Transparency (article III). The Most Favored Nation rule stipulates that each member will immediately and unconditionally assign service suppliers of a foreign country a treatment no less favorable than that given to service suppliers of any other member country, while transparency obliges countries to guarantee service suppliers access to information related to trade in services (laws, regulations, rules, etc.).
The GATS, in contrast to other WTO agreements, is not a closed agreement.
Rather, it is a legal framework and a system of rules that allow WTO member countries to adopt commitments on trade liberalization by means of successive negotiating rounds. On paper, GATS only obliges member countries to participate in negotiations; it does not oblige them in the process of such negotiations to liberalize their services.
I now look at various relevant issues to better understand the logic of GATS and the negotiating process.
Methodology of the GATS negotiations
GATS negotiations take place within the Council for Trade in Services of the WTO (Larsen, Martin et al. 2002) . There are different types of negotiations with different contents and procedures that are being developed in the framework of the Council for Trade in Services (rules, domestic regulation, modalities, etc.). Nevertheless, the bulk of the negotiation is centered on trade liberalization. This area is negotiated based on the method of demand-offer. It means that during the negotiation period, the member countries demand to the other countries to liberalize those sectors where they have exportation interests. In response to the demands, the countries also present offers of liberalization that are able to be modified depending on the evolution of the negotiation process itself. The round finishes when members present a definitive list of offers that will be integrated in the GATS as a part of the new liberalization commitments of the member countries. All member countries are obliged to submit a list of commitments on liberalization, but they do not have to include improvements with respect to the previous list, nor new commitments on liberalization (Verger, 2008) .
The lists of commitments inform us about the degree of opening up to trade that the member countries assume in each of the various service sectors. Concretely, the lists specify the limits that the countries decide to maintain or eliminate in the areas of National Treatment and Market Access. Additionally, the commitments and limitations are expressed in terms of each of the different modes of trade (cross-border supply; consumption abroad; trade presence; presence of natural persons).
At any moment, irrespective of the development of the negotiations underway, countries are able to introduce new commitments on their lists. In contrast, the agreement establishes hurdles to the withdrawal of commitments already established (see article XXI of the GATS). As a result of this, the development of GATS aggravates and blocks a series of pro-market regulatory frameworks (Robertson and Dale 2003b) .
EduGATS: Measuring the degree of educational liberalization
The rationale and the content of the lists of commitments reveal the necessary elements to calculate the degree of liberalization indicated by the lists themselves. Carrying out these calculations is necessary due to that fact that my exploration is developed at two analytical levels. In the first, I observe the relation between the independent variables and the establishment ('yes' or 'no') of liberalization commitments in the educational sector from member countries. At the second level of analysis, I observe the relation between the same explicative variables with the 'degree' of commitment to liberalization. In this case, I only contemplate those countries that have adopted some liberalization commitment in education. To realize the analysis at this level means having to effectively measure the degree of commitments that has been established by member countries. To date, measuring the degree of liberalization commitments has not been done in a precise manner. For instance, agencies such as the OECD and the WTO itself usually report on the GATS results referring only to the number of sub sectors committed as a main indicator (OECD 2002b; WTO 2005) . Thus, I have constructed a new index for doing this measurement, which I call EduGATS. This index is also useful to compare the liberalization degree of higher education with the liberalization degree of other education levels. Finally, it is worthwhile to mention that the formula to calculate EduGATS could be applied to explore the liberalization degree in other sectors contemplated by GATS. Nevertheless, in this research I apply it exclusively to the education sector and its corresponding sub sectors.
Calculation of EduGATS
When calculating EduGATS, I take into account the following factors: a) The educational sub sectors committed; b) Limitations in Market Access and National Treatment, which may vary depending on the sub sectors and the four trading modes; and c) Horizontal commitments, which are transversal to the sectorial commitments.
The basic premise is that the higher the number of limitations in the lists of consider that eight is an appropriate number because it is the number of National Treatment limitations suggested in the most exhaustive list detected -see (WTO 2000) .
EduGATS is the result of adding both factors. Once weighted, it may have a value between zero (for totally closed sectors) and one (maximum openness). The resulting formula is: EduGATS = Σy(MAx) + Σy(NTx).
Liberalization of Higher Education. The State of Play
In recent decades, trade in higher education services has increased much more than trade in other education services. This is reflected in all the modes of supply and in the emergence of a wide range of new 'for profit' providers (OBHE 2002; OBHE 2003; Rodríguez Gómez 2003) . Therefore, higher education is the education sector under the much pressure to be internationally liberalized. For instance, in the Doha Round context the unique plurilateral request on education has been focused on Private Higher Education and Other Private Education Services 2 .
Nevertheless, as shall be seen in this section, this trend is not already reflected in the liberalization commitments undertaken in the GATS framework. To date, fiftyseven WTO member countries have included at least one education sub sector in their lists of commitments, and forty-eight of them have established commitments in higher education. 3 In the Figure 1 , I show the percentage of sub sectors liberalized by these fifty-seven member countries. As can be seen, higher education is liberalized with the same frequency as secondary education and slightly more than primary education.
"Other Educational Services" is not so greatly liberalized probably because, as some negotiators state, it is not clear which kind of education services are contemplated within this category. Finally, Adult Education is slightly more liberalized than higher education.
XXXXXXXXXXXXX FIGURE 1 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
When the EduGATS is applied to capture the level of liberalization commitments adopted by countries, it is possible to observe that the level of liberalization of higher education is slightly higher than the level of liberalization for the average of education sectors. This is a common pattern for most of the member countries and it does not depend on the level of economic development of the countries as can be observed in the Tables 1, 2 , 3 and 4. It must be said that I adopt the economic development categories applied by the WTO in its Services Data Base.
XXXXXXXXXXXXX TABLE 1 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  XXXXXXXXXXXXX TABLE 2 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  XXXXXXXXXXXXX TABLE 3 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  XXXXXXXXXXXXX TABLE 4 In order to understand the reasons why liberalization in education advances more slowly than in other sectors, it must be considered that education and, for example, health or water supply are sectors in which the state provision normally predominates and which are fundamental services for the effective implementation of a series of social rights. Consequently, in the framework of the GATS negotiations, sectors of these characteristics are known as "sensitive sectors". In fact, some governments, normally progressive and often under pressure from the civil society, have stated publicly that they will not liberalize this kind of services (Verger and Bonal 2006; Kachur 2003) .
In short, the non-liberalization of education opted for by most of the WTO member countries may be influenced by the awareness about the effects of GATS commitments on sensitive sectors. Some of these effects could be the limitation of the regulatory capacity of the states (Robertson, Bonal et al. 2002; Robertson and Dale 2003) 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXX FIGURES 4 AND 5 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
In the figure 4, it can be observed how the larger the presence of the private sector in higher education in a country is associated with a lower frequency of establishment of commitments in the educational sector. This may be due to the fact that governments believe the domestic educational supply (state and private) to be sufficiently wide and, consequently, deem it unnecessary to facilitate the entrance of foreign suppliers into their educational systems by means of GATS. Another plausible explanation is that, due to its strong position, the private sector has the ability to bring pressure to bear on governments so that they do not liberalize education in the framework of GATS and therefore avoid having to compete with foreign suppliers. Regarding this issue, for instance, Mundy and Iga (2003) document that the lobby of private universities in the USA is very active and effective when exercising pressure on the Congress not to liberalise the higher education sector. Second, as can be seen in the figure 5, those countries that provide more subsidies to the private sector acquire fewer commitments.
This relationship may indicate that those countries that heavily subsidize their domestic private sector are not ready to apply the same rules on subsidies to foreign educational centers. Additionally it would be plausible to consider, once again, the pressure brought to bear by the higher education private sector, which would be biased towards nonliberalization and would be motivated by the fact that private centers are not willing to "share the cake" of state funding with foreign suppliers.
On the other hand, I did not find a relation between the 'higher education services level of imports' and the liberalization commitments within the GATS. There are countries that facilitate the trade of education flows because they have adopted a strategy of capacity building and attracting expertise and knowledge from abroad. They would use the GATS and other trade forums to provoke this capacity building process.
It seems to be the case of countries such as China and Malaysia (Larsen et al, 2004; Zhang, 2003) . But my statistical analysis shows that this is no a policy that could be globally attributed to most of the countries, at least, when only the education trade flows are taken into account. The adoption of this strategy could be more common in developing countries, but I also found out that the non-relation between education imports and GATS commitments is a common pattern in all the countries, independently of their level of economic development.
Finally, I neither find that the private funding of education is statistically related to the degree of educational liberalization in the countries studied. This contradicts Mundy and Iga (2003) results, which show that there is a reverse relationship between education liberalization within the GATS and public spending in education. They explain this apparent "paradox" saying that the countries with higher liberalization commitments (which are, very often, developed European countries) "are relatively confident of their national ability to buffer dislocations to educational systems caused by the liberalization" (pp. 312). However, when applying the EduGATS, I do not contrast this statistical association -neither in relation to the education sector in general nor in relation to the higher education level. This difference in the results obtained by Mundy & Iga (2003) and I are the consequence of the different methods we used and, specifically, on the way of measuring liberalization commitments -see a deeper discussion on this in Verger (2008) . Nevertheless, what I want to highlight is that numerous education and social scientists -I include myself among them -are trying to identify education rationales in the countries' trade policy for education and, on occasions, we are forcing some of the explanations and hypothesis. Probably, instead of assuming that, in the GATS context, there is a causal relationship between the education necessities or strategies of the countries, our principal and preliminary research question should be: is there an 'education-oriented rationale' in the GATS negotiations?
b) Influence of countries' degree of development
The countries' degree of development is strongly related to the establishment of commitments on liberalization in education, both in the education sector and in the higher education sub sector. As shown in Figures 6 and 7 , the southern countrieswhich is a category that contemplate both developing countries and less developed countries (LDCs) -are more reticent to establish commitments in the area of educational services than are the northern -developed countries and transition countries.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXX FIGURE 6 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXX FIGURE 7 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
According to the interviews done to the trade negotiators from southern countries, the GATS is perceived, on occasions, as a suitable instrument to attract direct investment and expertise to educational systems, especially for those education levels, in particular higher education, that usually are under-funded by the state. That is, GATS can be a market solution for the limitation on state investment in education. So, why are southern countries much more reticent to establish liberalization commitments on higher education and other education services than northern countries? There are different factors that could explain this, but our first argument is based on the idea that Southern countries should perceive more "threats" or drawbacks than benefits in opening up trade within their education systems.
First at all, it should be considered that developing countries are almost net importers of higher education . Consequently, educational centers in many of these countries do not only have great difficulties in accessing global educational markets, but trade liberalization may also mean that they are expelled from their own markets by the foreign competition (Barrow, Didou-Aupetit et al. 2003; Rodríguez Gómez 2004) . Additionally, many Southern countries should be aware that trade liberalization as envisaged in GATS may introduce considerable complexity -as well as limitations -into the area of the domestic regulation and financing of educational systems (Malo 2003) . In fact, developing countries do not usually have already suitable legal and technical mechanisms to evaluate the quality of international (or domestic) higher education services. The internationalization of education in many Southern countries has often led to the multiplication of "diploma-mills" or "garageuniversities" (Carnoy 1999; García-Guadilla 2002) , terms that indicate the low quality of the services provided. Finally, some southern countries associate GATS commitments to a possible accentuation of the brain drain problem, which is usually a bigger problem for the poor countries than for the rich ones (Knight, 2003; Wende, 2003) .
Nevertheless, the development perspective seems appropriate when analyzing the liberalization of educational services in the WTO framework due to other reasons.
One of them is that southern countries usually condition their services offers on the outcome of negotiations concerning other issues included in the competences of the WTO, in which they have more offensive interests. I refer to sectors such as agriculture, cotton or textiles. Guided by this rationale, some delegations that have not liberalized education recognize that the educational sector might become a 'bargaining-chip' during negotiations. The bargaining-chip rationale contradicts frontally the education rationale I have just explained. To ascertain which the dominant rationale in the WTO forum is, more qualitative data would be needed. In any case, I have observed that both rationales coexist in the GATS negotiations in the education field. 
